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Abstract
The status of mood-congruent free recall bias in anxious individuals was evaluated following
incidental encoding of target words. Individuals with high and low levels of trait anxiety
completed a modified Stroop task, which revealed an attentional bias for threat-related stimuli in
anxious individuals. This group was significantly slower in naming the colour in which threat-
related words were displayed compared to neutral words. In a subsequent free recall test for the
words used in the modified Stroop task, anxious individuals recalled more threat-related words
compared to low-anxious people. This difference was significant even when controlling for the
false recall of items that had not been presented during study. These results support the view put
forward by Russo, Fox, Bellinger, and Nguyen-Van-Tam (2001) that mood-congruent free recall
bias in anxious individuals can be observed if the target material is encoded at a relatively shallow
level. Moreover, contrary to Dowens and Calvo (2003), the current results show that the memory
advantage for threat-related information in anxious individuals is not a consequence of response
bias.
Anxious individuals show selective processing biases for threat-related information. This is
evident primarily in interpretative and attentional tasks (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1997). To illustrate, clinically anxious patients and people with elevated trait
anxiety show increased interference in naming the colour in which threat-related words are
presented (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). In contrast, several studies indicate that
elevated levels of trait anxiety and the clinical condition of generalised anxiety disorder
(GAD) do not seem to be associated with explicit memory bias for threat-related information
(Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Williams et al.,1997).1
The absence of mood-congruent explicit memory bias in anxiety is predicted by the
influential model proposed by Williams et al. (1997). Their model states that integrative
perceptual processes, which operate on the perceptual/structural characteristics of an event,
are biased for mood-congruent stimuli in anxiety but not in depression. Thus, attentional
bias for mood-congruent stimuli in anxious individuals but not for depressed individuals is
consistent with the Williams et al. model. Conversely, the model posits that explicit memory
performance is a function of elaborative processing, and therefore depression, but not
anxiety, should be associated with a mood-congruent explicit memory bias. The apparent
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lack of an explicit memory bias among individuals suffering from GAD or showing elevated
trait anxiety, coupled with the presence of an explicit memory bias for depressive-related
information among clinically depressed subjects, is consistent with this prediction (see Matt,
Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992, for review).
However, Russo et al.(2001) have challenged the view that anxious individuals do not show
a mood-congruent recall bias. In reviewing studies on mood-congruent explicit memory bias
in high trait anxiety individuals and in GAD patients, they noted that the learning of targets
in these studies was generally intentional and followed tasks that promoted deep semantic
encoding of target words (e.g., Becker, Roth, Andrich, & Margraf, 1999; Bradley, Mogg, &
Williams, 1995). Russo et al. (2001) argued that the detection of mood-congruent memory
bias for threat-related information is unlikely under these conditions. This is because
intentional learning and semantic analysis of targets promotes a highly efficient encoding of
target material, so that there is little scope for emotional factors to further influence the
recall of affectively toned material. Therefore, mood-congruent explicit memory biases in
anxiety, if present, are more likely to be detected following study conditions that do not
promote efficient encoding of targets. These conditions should provide a greater opportunity
for emotional factors to influence the encoding of mood-congruent information, thus
providing a suitable basis for the emergence of a free recall bias in anxiety.
More specifically, Russo et al. (2001) predicted that when items are incidentally learned
using relatively shallow orienting tasks (e.g., counting the number of syllables present in
each target word), the minimal semantic analysis of threat-related targets should not divert
non-anxious participants from focusing only on the orienting task. Conversely, anxious
individuals should be diverted by the meaning of the threat-related stimuli, leading to a
deepening of processing of these stimuli during learning. Such an encoding bias would be
congruent with the attentional and interpretative biases shown by anxious individuals and
also provides a basis for the mood-congruent recall bias to emerge.
As predicted, Russo et al. (2001) did find that high trait anxiety individuals showed greater
recall of threat-related information compared to non-anxious individuals following an
incidental lexical orienting task that promoted a minimal semantic encoding of targets.
Moreover, when both semantic and lexical incidental orienting tasks were used, a mood-
congruent free recall bias emerged only for items studied following the lexical orienting
task. Thus, mood-congruent memory bias can be detected in high trait anxiety individuals
provided that the information is encoded at a relatively shallow level of processing (Russo et
al., 2001). Similar results to those described by Russo et al. (2001) were also obtained by
Friedman, Thayer, and Borkovec (2000) with a sample of GAD patients in a free recall task
that followed a relatively shallow incidental learning phase (i.e., subjects were asked to read
silently words that were displayed soon after colour patches had appeared on a computer
screen).
However, the notion that free recall bias in anxiety is process specific has recently been
challenged (Dowens & Calvo, 2003). These authors suggested that the increased recall of
threat-related information in anxiety does not reflect genuinely improved memory for threat-
related information but is simply a consequence of response bias (i.e., a general tendency to
report threat-related information). Using an incidental shallow encoding task comparable to
that used by Russo et al. (2001), they found that participants high in trait anxiety recalled
significantly more threat-related items than low-anxious individuals. However, when
Dowens and Calvo adjusted the recall scores by taking into account the number of threat-
related items that were recalled even though they had not been presented during learning
(i.e., intrusions), the difference in the number of threat-related words recalled between high-
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and low-anxious individuals was no longer significant. This supports the view that mood-
congruent recall bias in anxious individuals can be attributed to a response bias.
However, a closer scrutiny of Dowens and Calvo's results indicates that a genuine recall bias
for threat-related information may actually be present even when taking false alarms into
account. When the percentage of intrusions for threat-related information is subtracted from
the percentage of correctly recalled items in their data, it appears that, at least in the case of
physical-threat items, the difference between the high-and the low-anxiety groups is about
6.5%. Assuming that the variability in the corrected scores is comparable to that of the
uncorrected scores, then a t-test on the above difference would fall short of significance, i.e.,
t(38) = 1.76, p <.09. Given the relatively small number of participants in each anxiety group
(20), it is likely that the analyses on corrected free recall scores did not reach significance
due to relatively low statistical power. With 20 participants per group, and assuming a
medium effect size, d = 0.5, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference
in the corrected recall for physical-threat-related items between low- and high-anxious
groups was about .35. Therefore we argue that it is important to assess the extent to which
the null finding reported by Dowens and Calvo (2003) is replicable with greater statistical
power. Thus, the present experiment was designed to provide further empirical data to
determine whether or not free recall bias for threat-related information in anxious
individuals is genuine or indicative of a response bias.
To this aim, 40 high and 40 low trait anxious individuals were incidentally exposed to
neutral and threat-related words (these last comprised both ego- and physical-threatening
words) in a modified Stroop task. Given the nature of the modified Stroop task, (i.e., naming
the colour in which a series of words were displayed), this task provided an opportunity to
induce a relatively shallow incidental encoding of neutral and threat-related words, as well
as an opportunity to assess the presence of any attentional bias for threat-related information
in our sample of anxious individuals. Following the Stroop task, participants were
unexpectedly asked to recall all the words they could remember from those presented in the
colour-naming task. We expected a selective increment in the response time to threat-related
information in the Stroop task only in the group of anxious individuals, indicating that
threat-related words captured the attention of anxious individuals. We also expected a
selective increment in the free recall of threat-related words in anxious individuals compared
to non-anxious individuals. By taking into account the proportion of words falsely recalled
(i.e., intrusions), and subtracting these from the appropriate category of words (i.e., either
neutral or threat-related) we also assessed the extent to which any response bias could offset
any genuine free recall advantage for threat-related information in anxious individuals.
A brief digression is required at this point. Previous studies have already tested memory for
items presented in a modified Stroop task in high- and low-anxiety subjects, but instead of
free recall they used an unexpected recognition memory test for the word previously
presented and found no mood-congruent memory bias (e.g., MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995;
Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). Moreover, previous studies using recognition
memory, either with shallow or deeper encoding conditions, have also not provided
evidence in favour of mood-congruent memory bias in anxiety (e.g., Dowens & Calvo, 2003
– Exp. 2; Nugent & Mineka, 1994). We argue, however, that recognition memory tasks are
not suitable to assess the presence of subtle memory biases induced by mood traits and/or
states. As shown by Eich (1980), recognition memory is unlikely to be affected by subtle
manipulations like changes of either internal moods or environmental context between study
and test (see also Russo, Ward, Geurts, & Scheres, 1999). Hence, the lack of a mood-
congruent bias is not surprising in a recognition memory task. Because free recall provides a
more sensitive method to assess potential memory biases induced by subtle manipulations of
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either internal or external states, we opted to administer only a free recall test for the items
incidentally learned during the modified Stroop task.
Before describing the experiment in more detail, it is important to provide clear criteria for
an unequivocal assessment of memory bias in anxiety. We have previously argued that
evidence indicative of memory bias for threat-related information should comply with the
criteria that (a) there should be a significant interaction between anxiety status and word
type on the percentage of words recalled; and (b) anxiety should be associated with the
recall of more threat words. This should be coupled with low-anxious people showing better
or equal recall of neutral words than high-anxious individuals; alternatively, high-anxious
people may recall more neutral words than low-anxious people, provided this difference is
smaller than the one detected for threat words (Russo et al., 1999; Russo, Fox, & Bowles,
2001; see also Eysenck & Byrne, 1995).
METHOD
Participants
The Spielberger trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger, Gorusch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs,
1983) was administered to a sample of graduate and undergraduate students at the
University of Essex. On the basis of the trait anxiety scores, 40 low-anxious participants
who scored below 37 in the trait anxiety inventory (mean =32; range, 24–36), and 40 high-
anxious participants who scored above 43 in the inventory (mean = 52.4; range, 44–75) were
selected. The mean age of the low-anxiety group was 22.07 (SD = 3.09) years; the mean age
of the high-anxiety group was 21.05 (SD = 2.46). In each anxiety group 20 males and 20
females were tested. The mean state anxiety score in the high trait anxiety group was 52.7
(range 43–72) and in the low trait anxiety group this was 32.4 (range 22–40). Hence, the two
anxiety groups were clearly differentiated in terms of both trait and state anxiety.
Materials
The stimuli used in the Stroop task consisted of 24 neutral and 24 threat-related words (see
Appendix). These words were divided into two lists (list 1 and list 2). Each list comprised 12
neutral and 12 threat-related words (2 ego-threatening and 10 physical-threatening). Half of
the participants in each anxiety group were tested using the items in list 1, while, for the
remaining ones, the items in list 2 were used. The four sets of items differed in neither their
frequency of occurrence according to the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms, F(3, 44) <1.15,
nor in their length, F <1 (the mean word length of the four lists ranged from 6.25 to 6.75
letters per word).
Stimulus cards (A4 size) were used to display the stimuli in the Stroop task. Two cards
contained the 12 neutral words. These were printed five times using five different colours
(red, blue, black, pink, and green), so that each card displayed 60 items in two columns.
Two different random orders were chosen to arrange the stimuli on each of the two cards.
The same procedure was used to display threat-related words. In summary, each participant
received two cards containing the same 12 neutral words arranged in different ways and two
cards containing the same 12 threat-related words arranged in different ways. To facilitate
testing, the Stroop stimuli were presented on cards instead of on a computer screen. Card
presentation does not allow the measurement precision that can be obtained with a
computer-controlled presentation. Nevertheless, from the data reported in Williams et al.'s
(1996) review, the way in which Stroop stimuli are presented does not affect the presence of
attentional bias in anxiety. Moreover, as shown by Salo, Henik, and Robertson (2001), the
response times to incongruent stimuli in a standard Stroop task are comparable when
response times are obtained either from the overall set of stimuli (i.e., a condition
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comparable to the card version), or when response times are collected for individual items
under computer-controlled presentation conditions.
Design and procedure
We used a 2 ×2 mixed-subjects design, with anxiety (high trait vs low trait) as a between-
sub-jects factor and word type (threat-related vs neutral words) as a within-subjects factor.
The dependent variable for the Stroop task was the time taken, in seconds, to read out the
colour in which threat-related and neutral words were printed, while for the free recall task
this was the proportion of threat-related and neutral words recalled.
At the start of the experimental session participants were told that they had to perform a
series of tasks. The first consisted in naming aloud the colour in which words were
displayed on four index cards. Participants were told to perform this task as quickly and as
accurately as possible, ignoring (as much as possible) the meaning of the word. A practice
trial using six non-target neutral words repeated five times in the colours used in the main
Stroop task was given before the main task. The lists used (list 1 and list 2) and the order in
which the threat-related and the neutral word cards were presented (i.e., order 1: neutral,
threat, neutral, threat; order 2: threat, neutral, threat, neutral) were used equally across the
participants in each anxiety group. The time to perform the Stroop task was taken using a
digital stopwatch. Time was recorded at the nearest hundredth of a second. While
participants appeared to be accurate to the researcher while performing the Stroop task,
given the type of administration of the task, as for other studies (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod,
1985) no data on the accuracy of the responses were recorded.
A digit cancellation task, lasting 90 seconds, followed the Stroop task. Immediately after
this distractor task, participants were given a surprise free recall task. They were asked to
write down, in any order, as many words as they could remember from those presented in
the colour-naming task. Finally, participants completed the Spielberger state anxiety
inventory to ensure that their mood was relatively comparable to their trait anxiety score,
and then they were fully debriefed on the nature of the experiment.
RESULTS
Five participants, three in the low and two in the high trait anxiety groups, did not recall any
of the items from the Stroop task, thus they were excluded from statistical analyses.
Stroop task
The mean time taken to read out the colour in which neutral and threat-related words were
printed was computed (see Table 1). A two-way mixed ANOVA on these data revealed a
critical group by word type interaction, F(1, 73) = 35.74, MSE = 10.4, p <.01, suggesting an
attentional bias for threat-related information in high trait anxiety subjects. Planned
comparisons indicated that response times to threat-related words were significantly slower
than response times to neutral words in the high trait anxiety group, t(37) = 6.95, p <0.01,
but not in the low trait anxiety group, t(36) = 1.36, p >.10. Moreover, response times for
threat-related stimuli were significantly slower in the high than in the low trait anxiety
group, t(73) = 2.66, p <.01, while the difference between the two groups in the response
times to neutral was not significant, t(73) = 1.37, p >.10.
Free recall
The mean proportion of words correctly recalled was computed (see Table 2). A two-way
mixed ANOVA on these data revealed a critical group by word type interaction, F(1, 73) =
28.50, MSE = 0.006, p <.01, suggesting the presence of a mood-congruent free recall bias
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for threat-related words in the high trait anxiety group. This was confirmed by a series of
planned comparisons. More threat-related words were recalled by the high trait anxiety
group, t(73) = 5.46, p <0.01, while there was no significant difference between the groups in
the proportion of neutral words recalled, t(73) = 1.47, p >.10 (equivalent results were
obtained using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test in these and in the following
contrasts).
The mean proportions of neutral word intrusions during recall for the low and the high trait
anxiety groups were .007 and .018, respectively (Mann-Whitney test, z <1). For threat-
related words these means were .016 and .029, respectively (Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.57, p
<.10). The corrected mean proportion of neutral words recalled after subtracting the
proportion of intrusions is shown in Table 2. A mixed ANOVA on these data confirmed the
previous analysis on uncorrected recall scores. The interaction was again significant, F(1,
73) = 23.87, MSE = 0.007, p <.01, and more threat-related words were recalled by the
anxious individuals, t(73) = 3.61, p <.01.
DISCUSSION
A standard attentional bias for threat-related information was observed in a sample of 40
high trait anxiety individuals in a modified Stroop task (cf. Williams et al., 1996). Unlike
low trait anxiety individuals, anxious subjects were particularly slow in naming the colour of
threat-related words. The colour-naming task also acted as a relatively shallow incidental
encoding phase for the subsequent unexpected free recall of the neutral and threat-related
words. High trait anxiety individuals recalled significantly more threat-related words than
low trait anxiety individuals, while the two groups did not differ in the amount of neutral
words recalled. These results replicate and extend those obtained by Russo et al. (2001; see
also Friedman et al., 2000) using a different type of relatively shallow incidental orienting
task. More importantly, the present study showed that, when intrusions were taken into
account, free recall of threat-related information was still significantly greater in high-
anxious subjects. Given that the sample size used in the present study was almost twice the
size used by Dowens and Calvo (2003), we tentatively suggest that their failure to detect a
significant recall bias for threat-related information when intrusions were taken into account
was a consequence of relatively low statistical power. It should also be noted that, since the
majority of the threat-related words used in the present study were of a physical nature, it
could be argued that the recall bias we detected is primarily associated to the physical-
threatening nature of the target stimuli.
The present study, in conjunction with previous studies, suggests that the memory task used
is critical to detect a mood-congruent explicit memory bias. All previous studies assessing
an explicit memory bias in anxious individuals for items incidentally learned during a Stroop
task have failed to detect such bias (e.g., MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). However, these
studies used recognition memory rather than recall (as did Dowens & Calvo, 2003 – Exp. 2).
The present results confirm that free recall is a more suitable task to detect subtle effects of
mood on memory than recognition memory tasks (cf. Eich, 1980). The present results
provide support for the view that mood-congruent recall biases in high trait anxiety is a by-
product of an attentional processing bias towards threat-relevant information. Provided that
threat-related information is presented under conditions that induce a minimal semantic
analysis of target stimuli, as in the case of the Stroop task, it is more likely that the threat-
related nature of some target stimuli captures the attention of anxious individuals and, as a
consequence, these subjects are more likely to further elaborate threat-related words. Hence,
more threat-related words are recalled by trait-anxious individuals (Freidman et al., 2000;
Russo et al., 2001, present experiments).
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The detection of a mood-congruent free recall bias in anxious individuals is at variance with
the prediction made by the Williams et al.'s (1997) model that explicit memory bias is a
function of elaborative processing. Since depression, but not anxiety, is associated with
greater elaborative encoding of mood-congruent stimuli, no mood-congruent recall bias
should be observed among anxious individuals. However, since anxiety and depression are
highly correlated, it is possible that the current parallel biases in attention and memory were
due to high levels of anxiety and depression, respectively. While possible, it is relevant to
notice that while attentional biases are common in anxious individuals, they are rarely found
for depressed individuals (e.g., Williams et al., 1997). In the present experiment we found
both attentional and memory biases. On the basis of the above observation, it seems unlikely
that the attentional bias was driven by depression. Hence, it also seems unlikely that
depression is responsible for the recall bias. Therefore, the Williams et al. (1997) model may
need to be modified in order to fully account for the patterns of attentional and memory
biases observed in anxious individuals. The current results confirm mood-congruent recall
biases in high trait anxiety following relatively shallow incidental learning tasks, and
indicate that this effect is genuine and not due to a response bias (cf. Dowens & Calvo,
2003).
APPENDIX
Lists of items used in the experiment with the average frequency of occurrence according to
Kucera and Francis (1967)
Neutral Threat-related
List 1 List 2 List 1 List 2
cupboard lobster failure murder
whale capacity pain rape
library nephew terrified despair
clothing edition kill death
science furniture torture tragedy
memory salon strangled destruct
factory housed mutilated corpse
tool length threaten cancer
ankle window suffocate brutal
board amount hurt disaster
steamed wheat hatred victim
kettle vacuum agony crisis
Means 52.5 99.9 26.7 53.2
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High trait 82.6 (3.46) 87.9 (3.84)
Low trait 77.0 (2.09) 76.1 (2.21)
Time taken, in seconds, to read the colour of neutral and threat-related words by high and low trait anxiety subjects. Standard errors are in brackets.













High trait .088 (.012) .259 (.017)
Low trait .113 (.012) .144 (.012)
After the subtraction of intrusions
High trait .070 (.014) .230 (.021)
Low trait .106 (.012) .128 (.012)
Mean proportion of neutral and threat-related words recalled by high and low trait anxiety subjects, before and after subtraction of instrusions.
Standard errors are in brackets.
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